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ABSTRACT
The bright lines between certain fundamental legal categories may
appear to have dimmed in the cyber environment, especially in
relation to military cyber operations. This article thus unblurs the
lines between five such pairs of categories, proceeding from the
general to the specific: Firstly, what separates international law
from international norms as the two principal regulatory
frameworks governing the conduct of military cyber operations?
Secondly, what is the distinction between domain-specific and
general rules of international law as they apply to military cyber
operations? Thirdly, is it possible to distinguish between
peacetime and armed conflict with respect to the regulation of
such operations? Fourthly, once an armed conflict is underway,
how do we distinguish combatants from non-combatants in
cyberspace? And fifthly, what is the distinction between objects
and non-objects in cyberspace, particularly with respect to
computer data affected by military cyber operations during
armed conflicts? Overall, the article’s goal is to reduce the opacity
surrounding the relationship between military cyber operations
and international law. In doing so, it aims to contribute to the
long-term goal of making cyberspace a more open, secure,
stable, accessible and peaceful environment.
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States have long been acutely aware of the military utility of cyberspace. Several have
openly acknowledged the use of military cyber capabilities during armed conflicts and
many more are known to be developing such capabilities (ICRC 2021a, 8). Echoing
these trends, UN member States warned in a high-level consensus report adopted in
March 2021 ‘that the use of ICTs [information and communications technologies] in
future conflicts between States is becoming more likely’ and added that such uses may
result in ‘potentially devastating humanitarian consequences’ (OEWG 2021, paras 16
and 18). In June 2021, in a historical first, another UN-based group of governmental
experts expressly referred to international humanitarian law (IHL) in the cyber context,
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noting that this branch of international law ‘applies only in situations of armed conflict’
(GGE 2021a, para. 71(f)).
These two new reports have brought a degree of much-needed clarity from States into
the otherwise murky relationship between military cyber operations and international
law. To some extent, the opacity is understandable: States tend to be tight-lipped
about their military capabilities and shroud their cyber conduct in layers of secrecy
(Clarke and Knake 2010, xi). At the same time, for many years, they had been reluctant
to publicise their legal views on matters related to military cyber operations (Mačák
2017a, 881). However, the tide is now turning. Military cyber operations and their
impact on civilians are becoming the focus of increased international attention (see,
e.g. ICRC 2021a) and, one by one, States have started issuing national positions on inter-
national law and cyber operations, many of which include questions of military uses of
cyberspace (see CCDCOE 2021a; Roguski 2020). As a new Open-Ended Working Group
begins its work in late 2021, international regulation of military cyber operations is
bound to remain a staple of future multilateral discussions.
Accordingly, it is the right time to look more closely at the less well-understood aspects
of the application of international law to military cyber operations. For conceptual clarity,
international law is understood here as the legal order meant to structure the interaction
between actors participating in and shaping international relations, the predominant
among which are States (Besson 2010, 163). With respect to military conduct, a key
branch of international law is IHL, which consists of a body of rules that seek, for humani-
tarian reasons, to limit the effects of armed conflict (ICRC 2014). Military cyber operations
are understood here as the use of cyber capabilities bymilitary actors to achieve objectives
in or through cyberspace. Such operations can fulfil a range of purposes but are perhaps
most simply categorised into exploitation, defence and offence. These three categories
are often interlinked: for example, exploitation often needs to be carried out before an
offensive operation can be launched (see further, ICRC 2021a, 16–17).
In the particular nature of the cyber environment, the bright lines between a number
of fundamental legal categories may appear to have dimmed, especially as these apply to
military cyber operations. Each of the next five sections of this article thus unblurs the line
between one such pair of key categories, going from the general to the specific. Firstly,
what separates international law from international norms as the two principal normative
frameworks governing the conduct of military cyber operations? Secondly, what is the dis-
tinction between domain-specific and general rules of international law as they apply to
military cyber operations? Thirdly, is it possible to distinguish between peacetime and
armed conflict with respect to the regulation of such operations? Fourthly, once an
armed conflict is underway, how do we distinguish combatants from non-combatants
in cyberspace? And fifthly, what is the distinction between objects and non-objects in
cyberspace, particularly with respect to computer data that might be affected by military
cyber operations during armed conflicts?
2. Regulatory frameworks for military cyber operations: international law
and norms
The first line to be unblurred relates to the contours of international law regulation of mili-
tary cyber operations. Certain areas of human conduct, such as the high seas or outer
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space, benefit from dedicated treaties that codify key international legal rules governing
these areas. No such international treaty has yet been agreed for State conduct in cyber-
space, despite various proposals going back nearly three decades (Mačák 2017a). Accord-
ingly, the exact scope and boundaries of the international legal framework governing
cyber conduct are themselves subject to interpretation and disagreement.
To begin with, it is now universally agreed that international law is applicable to cyber
operations. This means that cyberspace is not the ‘Wild Wild West’ that it had sometimes
been described as (Perlroth and Sanger 2015). We do not have to start writing rules gov-
erning cyber conduct from scratch; conversely, existing rules of international law main-
tain, at least in principle, their relevance in cyberspace. This is the case even if those
rules – such as those regulating State sovereignty or use of force – had emerged well
before the advent of technologies that enable the existence of cyberspace as we know
it today.
Given the absence of a global cyber treaty, the applicable rules must be identified
through a careful analysis of existing international legal obligations. These may be
found in international treaties such as the 1945 Charter of the United Nations or the
1949 Geneva Conventions. They may also be of customary nature, which means that
they reflect general practice accepted as law. For example, there is a general agreement
that States must not conduct cyber operations that would directly or indirectly intervene
in the internal affairs of another State, and thus violate the customary prohibition of inter-
vention (GGE 2021b, para. 71(c)). The growing trend of publishing national positions on
the application of international law to cyber operations – most recently, 15 States did
so in an ‘official compendium’ that complemented the GGE report mentioned earlier
(see GGE 2021b) – provides valuable material for the understanding of international
law in the cyber context (see further, Mačák 2017a, 896–98). Ongoing projects that
aspire to catalogue these emerging views – such as the Tallinn Manual 3.0 or the Cyber
Law Toolkit – help reveal the points of convergence and divergence among States (see
CCDCOE 2021b and 2021c).
However, not all internationally agreed standards of State conduct qualify as inter-
national law. In particular, in recent years, States have been actively discussing so-
called norms of responsible State behaviour in cyberspace (also referred to as ‘cyber
norms’). In the cyber context, norms are understood as non-binding and voluntary in
nature, and thus often portrayed as ‘a pathway to easier consensus in a challenging
realm’ (Adamson 2020). A milestone in that regard was the 2015 report of an UN-man-
dated Group of Governmental Experts (GGE 2015), which recommended 11 such norms
and recognised that additional ones could be developed over time. Although the next
GGE failed to achieve consensus in 2017, contemporary reports of the ‘death of the
norms process’ (e.g. Grigsby 2017) turned out to be rather exaggerated. This is now
confirmed by the two 2021 consensus reports mentioned earlier – one by a renewed
GGE and another one by a new Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) – both of which
have also reflected the increased attention paid to military cyber power by States (GGE
2021b, para. 7; OEWG 2021, para. 16).
Confusingly, these fora discuss cyber norms and international law side by side, with fre-
quent overlaps. For instance, the 2015 GGE report referred to the need for States to
respect human rights online both in the section dedicated to cyber norms (para. 13(e))
and in the section on international law (para. 28(b)). It has been suggested that these
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repetitions highlight the fact that States have not been able to consistently distinguish
between norms and law in their practice (Delerue, Douzet, and Géry 2020, 31–32).
From a broader perspective, scholarly analyses have shown that many of the agreed
norms actually reflect existing international law (e.g. Adamson 2020).
Indeed, the two types of standards do share a number of characteristics. They are both
intended to set benchmarks for the evaluation of State behaviour, distinguishing between
internationally acceptable and unacceptable forms of conduct. In this way, norms and law
both provide the basis for calling out bad behaviour and overall aim to make State behav-
iour more predictable in volatile times such as during armed conflict (Broeders and van
den Berg 2020, 4). In addition, norms and law are closely related concepts and, at least
in theory, an inter-State agreement on norms may gradually influence the development
of the law (Finnemore and Hollis 2016, 441–42).
However, norms and law also differ in fundamental aspects. The main among them is
precisely the legally binding nature of international law, and that a violation of such a rule
gives rise to international responsibility, which cannot be said of non-binding norms gov-
erning cyber conduct (Mačák 2017a, 882; Delerue, Douzet, and Géry 2020, 30). For States,
this responsibility for a violation of international law triggers so-called secondary obli-
gations under the law of State responsibility, which include in particular the obligations
of cessation and reparation (ARSIWA 2001, Articles 30(a) and 31(1)). For example, if a
State conducts a cyber operation that amounts to a prohibited intervention in the internal
affairs of another State, it is legally obliged to cease its wrongful conduct (if it is continu-
ing) and to provide full reparation to the injured State for the harm caused. Particularly
grave forms of cyber conduct – for instance, military cyber operations directed against
medical facilities during armed conflict – may additionally qualify as international
crimes and result in individual criminal responsibility of the persons involved (Ambos
2015; Mačák, Gisel, and Rodenhäuser 2020).
International law thus sets down a minimum standard of responsible behaviour that is
binding on States. Although the absence of a compulsory enforcement mechanismmakes
it more complicated to sanction violations of international law, States are nonetheless
considerably more reluctant to breach international law, as opposed to non-binding
norms (Schmitt and Vihul 2014). Importantly, commentators have warned that the
norms discourse may sometimes serve to detract from, and thus undermine, international
law (Delerue, Douzet, and Géry 2020, 35; Moynihan 2020, 14; Tikk 2020, 7; Akande, Coco,
and de Souza Dias 2021), although others have argued that, conversely, norms and inter-
national law are mutually reinforcing (Adamson 2020, 19; Broeders 2021, 6). In addition, it
has been noted that norms may be more effective for the purposes of peacetime use of
cyber capabilities than for the regulation of military cyber operations (Ruhl et al. 2020, 13).
These debates further underscore the need to clearly distinguish between the two
standards.
As a matter of legal logic, non-binding norms can never override binding legal rules.
The 2015 GGE report confirms that axiom when it notes that cyber norms do not seek
to limit or prohibit action that is otherwise consistent with international law (para. 10).
The reverse is also true: a non-binding norm cannot permit action that would otherwise
be forbidden by international law. This has now been clarified in the new 2021 OEWG
report, which has reaffirmed that norms do not replace or alter States’ binding legal obli-
gations or rights, but rather provide ‘additional specific guidance’ on what constitutes
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responsible State behaviour in cyberspace (para. 25; for similar observations by individual
States see, e.g. Australia 2021, 3; Germany 2021, 16; Japan 2021, 2). The 2021 GGE report
added that in doing so, norms ‘can help to prevent conflict in the ICT environment and
contribute to its peaceful use’ (para. 15).
Overall, international law provides binding legal boundaries on the permissible
conduct in cyberspace by States, including their armed forces. Within this permitted
space, States may engage in further ‘normative construction’ (Schmitt and Vihul 2014)
and develop additional non-binding norms of responsible behaviour. In other words,
these norms set a higher, more desirable standard of responsible behaviour, over and
above the applicable minimum laid down by international law. Having demarcated the
line between law and norms as it applies to military cyber operations, the remainder of
the present article focusses on the legal regulation of such operations.
3. Identification of legal rules applicable to military cyber operations:
domain-specific and non-domain-specific rules
The second line to be unblurred relates to the supposed distinction between domain-
specific and other rules of international law. This question builds on the longstanding dis-
cussion about the type of legal rules that are appropriate for cyberspace governance and
the way in which it is answered determines the extent to which cyber activities, including
military cyber operations, are governed by international law. This section argues in favour
of a broad approach, according to which there is no general requirement under inter-
national law to examine whether a given rule is specifically applicable in the ‘cyber
domain’.
The dichotomy underlying the discussion in this section can be traced back to the early
stages of the internet’s development, when it was argued that rules that had been
designed for the ‘offline world’ should not reach into cyberspace (e.g. Johnson and
Post 1996). Such proposals saw the ‘online world’ as a new form of space or a new
domain, which would over time develop its own domain-specific system of rules and
legal institutions. However, States soon began to understand the growing potential of
cyberspace for the achievement of their vital interests, including national security,
public safety and economic development (Mačák 2017a). Unfazed by the anarchic propo-
sals of the mid-1990s, they gradually extended the reach of their domestic legal frame-
works into cyberspace.
Although it took slightly longer for international law to catch up, in 2013, a consensus
was finally reached in the international community that international law applies to cyber-
space (GGE 2013, para. 19; UN Doc A/Res/68/243 2013). Read at face value, the statement
would seem to imply that all international legal rules are relevant for human conduct in
cyberspace, just as they are for conduct anywhere in the physical world. However, not all
States are fully aligned with such interpretation.
For example, Russia and Nicaragua have both suggested that cyberspace is and will
remain a ‘de facto “legal vacuum”’ until States agree on a global legal instrument provid-
ing for specific modalities of such applicability (Russia 2020a, 1; Nicaragua 2020, 2–3; see
also Cuba 2020, 3). Without such binding guidelines, the argument went, the statement
from the 2013 report is ‘left hanging in the air and cannot be applied in practice’ (Russia
2020b, 1).
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More recently, Israel also argued against the automatic applicability of international
legal rules in the cyber context. In a national position published in early 2021, it suggested
that customary rules would only apply to cyberspace if the practice that they are based on
was ‘closely related to the activity envisaged in the cyber domain’ and if the opinio juris
which gave rise to the rule in question was not specific to some other domain (Israel 2021,
397).
However, such suggestions do not accurately reflect the nature and functioning of
international law. First of all, there is no general requirement in international law to
examine whether a given rule is applicable to a particular ‘domain’. In fact, the notion
of domains does not have an established international law definition. It may be useful
in military and legal theory as an organisational concept that structures the thinking
about particular forms of activities, interaction and resources (e.g. McCosker 2020). But
there are no accepted criteria for clustering such activities, interaction or resources into
specific ‘domains’. This is well-illustrated by the unending controversy regarding
whether cyberspace even qualifies as a standalone domain (in favour: e.g. Lynn 2010;
Ryan et al. 2011, 1167–68; Wilson 2014, 8; against: e.g. Rid 2013, 166; Tallinn Manual
2017, 12; Delerue 2020, 11). This author shares the view that the answer to this contro-
versy is in any case irrelevant for the purposes of applicability of international law to
cyber operations (see, in the context of IHL, Gisel, Rodenhäuser, and Dörmann 2020, 298).
Secondly, even if we could agree on a categorisation of domains (and that cyberspace
itself constitutes such a domain), it is not clear how the link between a rule and a domain
would be established. Some rules are simply formulated in such general terms that
searching for a narrow link of this kind would be meaningless. For example, IHL prohibits
direct attacks against civilians and civilian objects, without distinction as to the weapons
used or the location of the attacks (ICRC 2005, Rules 1 and 7). Applying similar logic, the
International Court of Justice held that the fundamental principles and rules of humani-
tarian law apply to ‘all forms of warfare and to all kinds of weapons’ (Nuclear Weapons
1996, para. 86). Therefore, it does not matter what specific means (technological or other-
wise) a party to a conflict uses, as long as doing so qualifies as an attack, it must not be
directed at civilians or civilian objects.
Other rules might be restricted in their application to certain persons, times, locations
or subject matter. In law, such limitations are considered to establish respectively the per-
sonal, temporal, geographical and material scope of application of those rules.1 It may
happen that these constraints, taken together, exclude the applicability of a given rule
from the cyber context. For instance, Article 26(1) of the Third Geneva Convention pre-
scribes that prisoners of war must be provided with sufficient basic daily food rations.
The personal scope of application of this rule is limited to prisoners of war; its temporal
scope, like the rest of the Convention, covers the period from the time they fall into
the power of the enemy until their final release and repatriation; its geographical scope
is limited to premises where the prisoners are interned, which are normally restricted
to locations on land; and its material scope concerns the maintenance of the prisoners
(see ICRC 2021b, 404, 721–22 and 766). Taken together, the rule leaves little meaningful
scope to govern the conduct of cyber operations. However, the inapplicability of Article
26(1) to cyber operations follows from its scope of application, and not from any general
proscription against applying ‘land domain-specific’ rules to other domains.
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In fact, many rules that have emerged in non-cyber ‘domains’ such as land, sea or air,
can still have implications for the regulation of cyber conduct. Consider, for instance, the
legal regime governing the so-called innocent passage of foreign vessels through a
coastal State’s territorial sea (LOSC 1982, Articles 17–26). Clearly, the geographic scope
of application of the relevant rules is limited to the maritime area up to 12 nautical
miles from the baselines (i.e. the territorial sea), a part of the ‘sea domain’. However,
the range of activities governed by these rules may well include military cyber activities
conducted from or through a vessel traversing the territorial sea. For example, passage
of a foreign ship is not considered innocent if it engages in ‘any act aimed at interfering
with any systems of communication’ of the coastal State (LOSC 1982, Article 19(2)(k)). This
formulation is technology-neutral and it thus extends to interference by cyber means
such as hacking the coastal State’s systems through a transiting foreign ship (e.g.
Swanson 2011, 730).
Overall, this analysis confirms that there is no general principle that would exclude the
applicability of international law rules to the uses of new technologies, including those
taking place ‘in the cyber domain’. Accordingly, there is no requirement to look for a
‘further proof of applicability to ICTs or other new technologies via specific state practice
and opinio juris “in cyberspace”’ (Akande, Coco, and de Souza Dias 2021). Rather, the start-
ing point must be that existing international law is applicable, as a matter of principle, to
all forms of human activity, whether they involve muskets or malware.
4. Situational context of military cyber operations: peacetime and armed
conflict
The third line to be unblurred relates to the distinction between situations of peace and
war as legal categories. It is sometimes suggested that this ‘binary’ distinction is no longer
adequate in today’s complex, multipolar and interconnected world (e.g. Brooks 2018).
Compounding the problem, States and other actors engage in so-called ‘grey-zone oper-
ations’, which are described by experts as referring to competition that appears to fall
between the standard categories of peace and war (ICRC 2021a, 15). And it was recently
argued in this Journal that States use cyberspace ‘first and foremost to wage wars’,
although – somewhat paradoxically – the authors added that ‘the attacks conducted
until today have remained below the threshold of war according to international law’
(Douzet and Géry 2021, 2). So, is it possible to distinguish between peace and war with
respect to the regulation of military cyber operations?
To begin with, it should be noted that the boundary between these two categories of
international law has not remained static over time. Traditionally, international law had
been a composite of two disparate, mutually exclusive bodies of rules: one set for peace-
time (the law of peace) and another for the time of war (the law of war) (e.g. Phillimore
1879, 794). However, that is no longer true today. Rules that used to be clumped together
as peacetime law—such as those concerning State responsibility, treaty interpretation,
identification of custom or human rights—continue to apply after the outbreak of hosti-
lities (Mačák 2017b, 137; Fleck 2021, 78).
However, the same is not the case in reverse. In other words, the body of law designed
for the application in times of armed conflict – IHL – has retained its conceptual separation
from the rest of international law. Crucially, with very few exceptions, the material scope
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of application of IHL rules is limited to armed conflicts;2 this was very recently expressly
confirmed in the cyber context by the GGE (GGE 2021a, para. 71(f)). Generally speaking,
IHL rules have been formulated in such a way as to take into account the special circum-
stances of warfare (Gasser 1993). Therefore, absent a situation of armed conflict, it would
not necessarily be protective (or humanitarian) to apply the rules of IHL.
In that regard, it is sometimes suggested – particularly in the Western context – that
States should apply IHL to the conduct of military cyber operations, whether these take
place within or outside of armed conflicts (see, e.g. Ney 2020). On the one hand, such
statements of policy should be welcomed insofar as they amount to States’ voluntary
adoption of constraints going above and beyond their existing obligations applicable
in peacetime. For example, it is now well-understood that peacetime international law
does not unequivocally rule out hostile cyber operations against medical facilities (see
Mačák, Gisel, and Rodenhäuser 2020). Conversely, the protections under IHL can be
described as comprehensive, given that the applicable rules require that medical facilities
must be respected and protected at all times (ibid; see also First Oxford Statement 2020,
para. 5). Accordingly, a policy the application of which effectively rules out any military
cyber operations against hospitals whether in peacetime or in war should certainly be
considered a step forward. This is irrespective of whether such policy would be grounded
in ethical considerations, in extending IHL principles to non-armed conflict situations, or
in a combination of both of these approaches.
On the other hand, no unilaterally adopted policy may extricate a State from its exist-
ing obligations under international law. Specifically, the legal framework applicable in
peacetime contains no equivalent to the IHL notions of military objectives (which may
be attacked during armed conflicts provided all relevant rules are respected) or of inciden-
tal civilian harm (which IHL tolerates unless it is excessive in relation to the expected mili-
tary advantage, and provided that precautions have been taken to avoid it). Accordingly,
outside of armed conflicts, States cannot refer to the rules of IHL – which remain techni-
cally inapplicable – to justify cyber conduct that would amount to a violation of the rules
applicable in peacetime. Instead, in such situations, the conduct of military cyber oper-
ations by States is regulated by other branches of international law, including the law
on the use of force and human rights law, as applicable (Gisel, Rodenhäuser, and
Dörmann 2020, 306).
What remains to be determined, then, is whether a given situation qualifies as an
armed conflict, or not. This question poses little difficulty where cyber operations comp-
lement ongoing kinetic hostilities such as, for instance, in the conflict between the US-led
coalition and the Islamic State group or in the conflict between Israel and Hamas. It is also
generally accepted among scholars that the resort to cyber operations with similar effects
to classic kinetic operations between two States would amount to an international armed
conflict (Tallinn Manual 2017, 384). However, the law remains unsettled with respect to
the qualification of cyber operations that merely disrupt the operation of military or civi-
lian infrastructure, without physically damaging it (ICRC 2021b, 106). It should thus be
welcomed that States have started to express their views on the matter (e.g. France
2019, 12; Germany 2021, 7). Others should follow in their footsteps in order to allow for
a gradual consolidation of the law on this crucial point.
To sum up, in order to determine the applicable legal framework for specific forms of
cyber conduct, one must first establish whether these occur in the context of an armed
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conflict, or not. In the absence of an armed conflict, IHL does not apply and the conduct in
question remains governed by other branches of international law. Conversely, when an
armed conflict is underway, IHL is applicable; in the cyber context, this may raise new
interpretive challenges such as those that are the subject of the next two sections.
5. Individuals engaged in military cyber operations during armed
conflicts: combatants and non-combatants
The fourth line to be unblurred relates to the distinction between combatants and civi-
lians in the context of military cyber operations. For IHL of international armed
conflicts,3 this is a critical dichotomy: combatants are authorised to participate directly
in hostilities (and therefore enjoy combatant immunity from prosecution), whereas civi-
lians are not (Additional Protocol I 1977, Article 43(2)). By the same token, combatants
may be made the object of attack unless they surrender or are otherwise hors de
combat, whereas civilians are granted a general protection from the dangers arising
from military operations (Additional Protocol I 1977, Articles 41(1)–(2) and 51(1)).
While the distinction between civilians and combatants is a ‘cardinal principle’ of IHL
(Nuclear Weapons 1996, para. 78), its transposition to the cyber context is not without
interpretive difficulties. For instance, Russia has noted that it is ‘very difficult (if not
impossible) to draw a distinction in virtual space between… combatants and non-com-
batants’ (Russia 2020b, 2). Similarly, the former Ambassador of Switzerland to the US,
Martin Dahinden wrote that in cyberspace, ‘the fundamental distinction in international
humanitarian law between civilians and combatants is particularly unclear’ (Dahinden
2021, 8). And Japan recently underscored the question of how the existing law on ‘the
scope of combatants applies to cyberspace’ as one of the key unsettled issues in IHL
(Japan 2021, 7).
However, IHL does contain specific rules for the determination of status during armed
conflict. To begin with, it lays down the fundamental rule that within an international
armed conflict, every person is either a combatant or a civilian (Additional Protocol I
1977, Article 50(1)). It thus follows that if a given person does not fall under one of the
categories of combatants, that person must be considered a civilian. Also, in case of
doubt as to a person’s status in the context of the conduct of hostilities, IHL requires
that the person be considered a civilian (Additional Protocol I 1977, Article 50(1)).
So who qualifies as a combatant? Article 43(2) of Additional Protocol I states that
members of the armed forces of a party to an international armed conflict (other than
medical personnel and chaplains) are combatants. This treaty definition today reflects
customary international law binding upon all States, including those that have not yet
ratified the Protocol (ICRC 2005, Rule 3). Thus, members of military cyber units such as
the US Cyber Command, China’s People’s Liberation Army’s Strategic Support Force
Network Systems Department, or Israel’s Unit 8200 would qualify as combatants during
an international armed conflict.
Although the remote nature of their operations makes this unlikely, if such persons fall
into enemy hands, they become prisoners of war protected by the 1949 Third Geneva
Convention and they may not be punished for the mere fact of having participated in hos-
tilities during an international armed conflict. By contrast, they may and must be prose-
cuted for any war crimes they may have committed, such as intentionally directing
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attacks against civilian objects (ICC Statute 1998, Article 8(2)(b)(ii)) – while noting that
what is an attack and what is an object with regard to the application to cyber operations
of the IHL rules on the conduct of hostilities remains in some aspects unsettled (with
regard to attacks, see Mačák and Gisel 2022; with regard to objects, see next section).
Under customary law, members of the armed forces who fail to distinguish themselves
while engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack (e.g. by not
wearing a uniform), forfeit the right to prisoner-of-war status and, consequently, the com-
batant privilege (see ICRC 2021b, 363). There is some debate on the extent to which this
rule is relevant to cyber operations (Tallinn Manual 2017, 405–06). In particular, it has been
argued that the requirement to distinguish oneself only applies in circumstances in which
the failure to do so ‘might reasonably cause an attacker to be unable to distinguish
between civilians and combatants’, which would thus increase the risk of mistaken
attack against civilians (ibid. 405). The alternative view, to which this author subscribes,
is that the rule on distinction should be complied with even if the remoteness of the com-
batants from the targets of their cyber operations reduces the ‘practical significance’ of
wearing a uniform (see United States 1999, 8). Requiring that cyber combatants dis-
tinguish themselves at the requisite times will also avoid any allegations that they were
acting under the false pretence of being a civilian, which could amount to the war
crime of perfidy (Horowitz 2021). More broadly, this interpretation also safeguards the
fundamental principle of distinction against erosion caused by the introduction of
additional criteria that may lead to arbitrary application (such as reasonableness with
respect to the attacker’s ability to distinguish or to the expected risk of mistaken
attack). Overall, the customary rule should thus be seen as fully applicable also with
respect to the military personnel engaged in cyber operations.
In some States, non-military personnel, such as intelligence agency staff or other gov-
ernment employees, may also be involved in the conduct of military cyber operations
(ICRC 2021a, 9). If such agencies or other State organs are incorporated into the armed
forces (on which, see ICRC 2005, 16–17 and Tallinn Manual 2017, 406), their personnel
become combatants. That means that they have the right to participate directly in hosti-
lities, which includes conducting military cyber operations against the enemy during an
international armed conflict, and if they are captured, they are entitled to prisoner-of-
war status (Geneva Convention III 1949, Article 4A).
Conversely, if entities are not incorporated into the armed forces and their personnel
are not otherwise members of armed forces, they are not combatants, and accordingly
must be considered as civilians. While IHL does not strictly prohibit civilians from partici-
pating in hostilities (see ICRC 2009, 83; United States 2016, paras 4.15.2.2 and 16.5.5), it
certainly does not encourage it, either. Specifically, civilian government employees who
take a direct part in hostilities are liable to attack for such time as they are directly parti-
cipating in hostilities. If they fall into enemy hands, they do not benefit from prisoner-of-
war status. And because civilians are not entitled to the combatant privilege, such persons
would also not enjoy immunity from domestic prosecution of the detaining State for
having directly participated in hostilities even if they had respected IHL in doing so.
More broadly, involvement of civilians in military operations is in direct tension with
the IHL principle of distinction. As noted by the ICRC, civilians ‘were never meant to
directly participate in hostilities on behalf of a party to a conflict’ (ICRC 2009, 38–39).
The principle of distinction requires that parties to armed conflicts distinguish between
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combatants and civilians at all times. The principle is most effective in practice if partici-
pation in hostilities is limited to those endowed with the combatant privilege. As such, the
practice of involvement of civilians in combat functions is eroding the principle of distinc-
tion (Bartolini 2010; Sassòli 2019) and, in the opinion of some writers, it violates the States’
obligation to uphold that principle (Cameron and Chetail 2013, 104). Overall, States
should thus ensure that military cyber operations that amount to taking direct part in hos-
tilities are conducted only by members of the armed forces (see United States 1999, 8).
6. Electronic data affected by military cyber operations during armed
conflicts: objects and non-objects
The final blurry line relates to the distinction between objects and non-objects in IHL.
Whether something is an object is critical for its protection in times of armed conflict,
given that the protection that IHL offers against civilian harm is expressed through a pro-
hibition against attacking civilian persons (Additional Protocol I 1977, Article 51(2)) and
civilian objects (Additional Protocol I 1977, Article 52(1)). More broadly, the legal category
of ‘objects’ is central to the entirety of the law of targeting, given that it constitutes a key
element of, among others, the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks, the definition of mili-
tary objectives, or the rules on active and passive precautions (Additional Protocol I 1977,
Articles 51(4), 52(2), and 57–58). In the pre-digital period, determining whether something
was an object posed little difficulty: while concrete things like civilian buildings or paper
files were protected objects, abstract notions like civilian morale or loyalty were not.
However, since computers came on the scene, a new category has appeared, which
was harder to qualify: digital or electronic data.
To illustrate, imagine that Ambrosia and Ruritania are two independent States
engaged in an international armed conflict against one another. Ambrosian armed
forces launch a cyber operation against the Ruritanian central registry office, which main-
tains digital records on Ruritanian citizens, with regard to various non-military purposes
such as census taking, the provision of social benefits, voting and taxation. The operation
results in the destruction of all data held by the registry office—but it does not directly or
indirectly cause any physical destruction, and it also does not affect the cyber infrastruc-
ture which supports the system used by the office. In other words, the data is gone, but all
the computers continue to function as they did before. Did Ambrosia violate IHL by
destroying the datasets held by the Ruritanian authorities?
The answer to that question hinges on whether data is considered to be more like a
paper file, or like loyalty. In other words, is data an object? If it is, then cyber operations
against data (such as deleting a dataset held by a registry office) are governed by the IHL
rules on the conduct of hostilities and the protection these rules afford to civilian objects.
If it is not, then these rules and protections would not apply, meaning that many types of
civilian data would be considered ‘fair game’ as long as the effects of the cyber operation
against them remain confined to cyberspace (Mačák 2015, 78). It should be noted,
however, that specific protection that IHL affords to some categories of objects covers
data belonging to those objects even if data itself is not considered as an object.4
On the question whether data qualifies as an object for the purposes of the IHL rules on
the conduct of hostilities, experts hold different views. On the one hand, the majority of
experts involved in the Tallinn Manual process considered that the ordinary meaning of
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the term ‘object’ cannot be interpreted as including data because objects are by definition
visible and tangible (Tallinn Manual 2017, 437). Some States also subscribe to this view
(see, e.g. Denmark 2016, 292; Chile 2020, para. 36; Israel 2021, 401). The key ramification
of this view is that military cyber operations against civilian data (including, for instance,
the registry datasets mentioned in the scenario above) would be outside the scope of all
IHL rules that only protect civilian ‘objects’, resulting in a significant gap in legal
protection.
On the other hand, others have argued that either all or some types of data should be
considered as objects under IHL. One view, taken by several States, is that the protection
of civilian objects extends to civilian data (see, e.g. Finland 2020, 7; Germany 2021, 8;
Romania 2021, 78; Norway 2013, para. 9.58). This implies that all data constitute objects
for the purposes of IHL. This interpretation is supported by the modern meaning of the
notion of objects in today’s society as well as by the object and purpose of the relevant
IHL rules (Mačák 2015, 80). It is also consistent with the traditional understanding of the
notion of ‘objects’ under IHL, which is broader than the ordinary meaning of the word and
encompasses also locations and animals (Gisel, Rodenhäuser, and Dörmann 2020, 319).
Another approach, thus far endorsed by one State, is to consider content data as pro-
tected under the principle of distinction (presumably this would include civilian registry
datasets mentioned in the scenario above), leaving to the side whether other types of
data (such as code) formally qualify as objects or not (France 2019, 14).
Overall, this wide spectrum of views shows that the question of whether and to what
extent data constitute objects for the purposes of their protection under IHL remains
unresolved at the present time. It may be that new approaches will need to be developed
to adequately protect the various functions of data in modern societies (for such propo-
sals, see, e.g. Schmitt 2019; Geiss and Lahmann 2021). Until then, it should be underscored
that whatever approach is taken, the replacement of paper files and documents with
digital files in the form of data should not decrease the protection that IHL affords to
them (ICRC 2019, 28). It might be that this final line cannot yet be fully unblurred, but
to view cyber operations against essential civilian data (such as the Ruritanian registry
datasets mentioned earlier) as permitted by IHL would result in a serious protection
gap during armed conflicts.
7. Conclusion
The point of departure of this article was that the seemingly blurred lines concerning the
regulation of military cyber operations reduce the legal certainty in cyberspace. However,
once we look more closely at the existing normative framework applicable to cyber oper-
ations, much of the mist begins to lift. As we have seen, in the first place, it is essential to
clearly distinguish between international law and norms of responsible behaviour as the
regulatory frameworks applicable to military cyber operations. International law lays
down the applicable binding minimum, while norms provide additional specific guidance
on what constitutes responsible State behaviour in cyberspace (see section 2).
Secondly, in the identification of specific legal rules applicable to military cyber oper-
ations, the starting point is that existing international law is applicable, as a matter of prin-
ciple, to all forms of human activity. There is accordingly no general requirement to
examine whether or not a rule is ‘domain-specific’, though the scope of a given rule
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might exclude its applicability from the cyber context (see section 3). By contrast, to deter-
mine the applicable legal framework for specific forms of cyber conduct, it is essential to
establish whether these occur in the context of an ongoing armed conflict, or not. If they
do, IHL is applicable; if they do not, they are regulated by other branches of international
law (see section 4).
Thirdly, during armed conflicts, it is possible to distinguish between combatants and
civilians also insofar as the conduct of military cyber operations is concerned, by reference
to the existing rules of IHL. Generally speaking, States should ensure that military cyber
operations that amount to taking direct part in hostilities are conducted only by
members of the armed forces (see section 5). Finally, the distinction between objects
and non-objects, as applied to electronic data during armed conflicts, remains unsettled
under IHL. However, whichever legal approach prevails over time, essential civilian data
should not be excluded from protection afforded by IHL so as not to create a serious pro-
tection gap (see section 6).
To summarise, the interpretations proposed here aim to reduce the opacity sur-
rounding the relationship between military cyber operations and international law.
Unblurring the lines separating the legal categories discussed in this article is essential
to the generally shared goal of making cyberspace a more open, secure, stable, acces-
sible and peaceful environment. It is hoped that this article will contribute towards
this goal, including through informing the future development of national positions
on international law in cyberspace and the multilateral discussions surrounding
these issues.
Notes
1. Sometimes, the combined effect of those limitations – especially the geographic and material
ones – is used to refer to certain sets of rules as being domain-specific. For example, IHL rules
regulating naval and air warfare are sometimes referred to as governing only the sea and the
air domain, respectively. However, as the discussion below demonstrates, such delineation
may be imprecise given that there are certain aspects of those rules that apply across the sup-
posed domains.
2. These exceptions relate primarily to measures that must be taken in peacetime in order to
ensure the respect for IHL in the event an armed conflict occurs, such as the duties to disse-
minate and train IHL, to adopt certain implementing domestic legislation, to carry out legal
reviews of new weapons, means and methods of warfare, or to take measures to protect civi-
lians against the effects of attacks.
3. In non-international armed conflicts, the notion of combatant status and the associated
concept of combatant privilege do not exist under IHL. Whether persons are allowed to
take part in hostilities in a non-international armed conflict is governed by domestic law.
Regardless of the legality of their participation in hostilities under domestic law,
members of the State armed forces, fighters for non-state armed groups and civilians
taking a direct part in hostilities must respect IHL, including when carrying out military
cyber operations.
4. In particular, the obligations to respect and protect medical facilities and humanitarian relief
operations extend to medical data belonging to those facilities and data of humanitarian
organizations that are essential for their operations. Similarly, deleting or otherwise tamper-
ing with data in a manner that renders useless objects indispensable to the survival of the
civilian population, such as drinking water installations and irrigation systems, is prohibited
under IHL (see further, Mačák and Gisel 2022, section 4.2.).
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